Dark Web Activities and Polish Criminal Law

The dark web is a part of the internet that is not indexed by standard search engines and is usually accessed through anonymising networks, including Tor. Its existence and use are not illegal under Polish law. Criminal liability depends on the specific conduct, the intent of the user, and the evidence showing participation in an offence.

For businesses, dark web crime in Poland is not only a law-enforcement issue. Leaked credentials, stolen databases, ransomware negotiations, unlawful trading in company information and impersonation schemes can quickly become a continuity, compliance and reputation risk. A company that discovers its data on a darknet marketplace should preserve evidence and assess its reporting, contractual and cybersecurity obligations without delay.

When does dark web activity become a criminal offence in Poland?

Polish criminal law does not contain a separate offence called “using the dark web” or “Tor illegal activity.” Tor software may be used for legitimate purposes, including privacy protection, research or secure communication. The legal assessment changes where an anonymised environment is used to commit, facilitate, organise or conceal an offence.

In practice, dark web prosecution may concern conduct such as:

• unauthorised access to IT systems, email accounts or cloud services;
• purchase, sale or use of stolen passwords, payment data or personal data;
• fraud, phishing, business email compromise and online investment scams;
• ransomware attacks, extortion and threats to publish stolen data;
• trading in narcotic drugs, weapons, forged documents or other prohibited goods;
• distribution or possession of prohibited pornographic content involving minors;
• offering malware, stolen databases, botnet access or tools designed for cybercrime.

The mere presence of a listing on a darknet marketplace does not automatically prove that a person placed it there, made a transaction or knew the nature of the material. Investigators must establish the link between the suspect and the relevant account, wallet, device, communication or shipment. This distinction is often central to the defence strategy.

Key Polish Criminal Code provisions relevant to darknet activity

Several provisions of the Polish Criminal Code may apply depending on the factual circumstances. Unauthorised access to information or interference with data may be prosecuted under Article 267, Article 268a or Article 269a of the Criminal Code. Article 267 covers, among other conduct, obtaining information without authorisation by overcoming electronic, magnetic, IT or other specific protection.

Article 269b of the Criminal Code addresses the production, acquisition, sale or making available of devices or computer programs adapted to commit certain computer offences. The provision may be relevant where a person distributes malware, credential-stealing tools or access-enabling software. However, technical capability alone is not always enough – the statutory elements, including the purpose required by the provision, must be proven.

Online fraud may fall under Article 286 of the Criminal Code, while computer fraud is addressed in Article 287. These provisions may be relevant where data processing is manipulated to obtain a financial benefit or cause financial loss. Cases involving stolen payment card data, compromised accounts or manipulated online transactions frequently require extensive digital evidence and financial tracing.

Where darknet activity concerns child sexual abuse material, Article 202 of the Criminal Code may apply. The legal assessment depends on the conduct, including production, dissemination, presentation, storage or possession, and on the content involved. In such matters, forensic examination of devices, files, metadata and user activity is particularly important.

Drug transactions arranged through a darknet marketplace may lead to liability under the Act of 29 July 2005 on Counteracting Drug Addiction. Depending on the conduct, relevant provisions may include Article 53, concerning introducing narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances into circulation, and Article 62, concerning possession. The classification depends, among other factors, on the substance, quantity, role of the person involved and evidence of commercial intent.

Darknet marketplace evidence and digital forensic challenges

Dark web cases often involve complex evidentiary questions. Law enforcement authorities may rely on seized devices, encrypted communications, cryptocurrency transaction records, postal deliveries, undercover operations, server data obtained abroad and intelligence shared by foreign agencies.

An IP address, a cryptocurrency wallet or a user nickname may be an important lead, but it does not automatically identify the perpetrator. Devices may be shared, compromised or remotely controlled. Accounts may be created using false details. Cryptocurrency transfers may require specialist analysis to determine whether a transaction can genuinely be attributed to a particular person.

Defence work in cybercrime matters should therefore examine the legality and reliability of evidence collection, the chain of custody, the integrity of digital copies and the methodology used by forensic experts. It may also be necessary to assess whether foreign evidence was obtained and transferred in accordance with applicable procedural rules and international cooperation mechanisms.

Cross-border dark web prosecution in Poland

Dark web investigations are frequently international. A suspect may be in Poland, a server in another jurisdiction, a marketplace operator elsewhere, and victims spread across multiple countries. Polish authorities can use international legal assistance and cooperate through Europol, Eurojust and direct channels available under European and international instruments.

Polish jurisdiction may apply even where elements of the conduct occurred abroad. The relevant rules include Articles 109-113 of the Criminal Code, but their application depends on nationality, place of conduct, effects of the offence and other statutory conditions. Jurisdiction should therefore be assessed individually in each case.

For companies, cross-border circumstances also affect incident response. A data breach may trigger obligations under the GDPR, including notification to the competent supervisory authority where the breach is likely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. The deadline under Article 33 GDPR is generally 72 hours from becoming aware of the breach, subject to the conditions set out in that provision.

Business response to a dark web threat

A company that identifies stolen information, an extortion demand or an impersonating darknet listing should avoid deleting potential evidence or negotiating without a documented assessment. Early actions should be coordinated between management, IT security, compliance, communications and legal advisers.

1. Secure logs, devices, emails, screenshots and relevant access records.
2. Identify whether customer, employee, financial or trade-secret data may be affected.
3. Assess criminal notification, GDPR reporting and contractual notification duties.
4. Limit further access, reset compromised credentials and document remediation measures.
5. Prepare controlled external and internal communications where reputation risk is material.

Kopeć & Zaborowski (KKZ) supports clients in cybercrime matters involving criminal proceedings, internal investigations, digital evidence and crisis management. A rapid but structured response can reduce disruption while preserving the company’s legal position.

This is informational material, not legal advice. The legal classification of dark web activity depends on the evidence, the role of the person concerned and the specific factual circumstances.

Where a criminal matter concerning dark web activity requires legal assessment, it may be useful to consult the case with a criminal lawyer. An early discussion can help identify possible procedural steps and evidence-related issues.

FAQ – Dark Web Activities and Polish Criminal Law

Is using Tor illegal in Poland?

No. Using Tor or another anonymising network is not itself prohibited. Criminal liability may arise only from the specific conduct carried out through that network.

Can a person be prosecuted in Poland for buying goods on a darknet marketplace?

Yes, if the goods or services are illegal, such as narcotic drugs, stolen data, weapons, forged documents or prohibited pornographic content. The prosecution must prove the relevant statutory elements, including knowledge and intent where required.

Can cryptocurrency transactions be used as evidence in a dark web case?

Yes. Blockchain records may be used alongside device evidence, exchange records, communication data and expert analysis. A wallet address alone does not necessarily establish the identity of its user.

What offences may apply to stolen passwords and databases?

Depending on the conduct, the case may involve unauthorised access to information under Article 267 of the Criminal Code, data interference provisions, fraud provisions or personal data protection issues. The exact classification depends on how the data was obtained, used or traded.

Must a company report data found on the dark web?

Not in every case. However, the company should promptly assess whether a personal data breach occurred and whether notification is required under Article 33 or Article 34 GDPR. Criminal reporting and contractual duties may also arise.

Can Polish authorities investigate a dark web crime committed partly abroad?

Yes. International cooperation is common in cybercrime cases. The scope of Polish jurisdiction depends on the circumstances and the rules set out, among others, in Articles 109-113 of the Criminal Code.

Bibliography

• [1] Act of 6 June 1997 – Criminal Code (Poland), in particular Articles 109-113, 202, 267, 268a, 269a, 269b, 286 and 287.
• [2] Act of 29 July 2005 on Counteracting Drug Addiction (Poland), in particular Articles 53 and 62.
• [3] Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 (GDPR), in particular Articles 33 and 34.
• [4] Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, done at Budapest on 23 November 2001.
• [5] Europol, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2024.